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29 May 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

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OK Indonesia: The debate in the Constituent Assembly on President Sukarno's request for a return to the 1945 constitution, which

would greatly increase the power of the executive, has concluded. A vote is expected within a few days. Although the outcome is still in question, pressures for acceptance have been increasing. Premier Djuanda has made a thinly veiled threat of an army takeover in the event of an unfavorable vote. Army leaders have just ended a national conference which was probably timed to bring pressure on the assembly for a favorable vote as well as to determine the support of regional commanders should extreme measures be required.

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III. THE WEST

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Under the constitution, executive power passes to the cabinet if the president is temporarily incapacitated. The senior member of the Supreme Court becomes provisional president if the president dies or resigns.

a sharp power struggle is likely to preclude any orderly transfer of power.

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29 May 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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Argentina: Violence flared up again in several cities on 26 and 27 May. The continued defiance of various labor unions led by Communists and extreme Peronistas has increased the likelihood that the disturbances will become still more serious. The strike leaders reject any compromise in their economic demands and appear to be using these demands in the hope of undermining the government. Frondizi has the support of the military. He probably will have to resort to strong repressive measures to stop the agitation. [REDACTED]

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IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Cambodia's International Orientation for the Next Year.
NIE 67-59. 26 May 1959. [REDACTED]

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Prospects for North and South Vietnam Over Next Two or Three Years. NIE 63-59. 26 May 1959. [REDACTED]

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29 May 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

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Indonesian Prime Minister Makes Thinly Veiled Threat of
Army Coup

Indonesia's Constituent Assembly, meeting in Bandung, was warned by Prime Minister Djuanda on 27 May that failure to readopt the 1945 constitution was likely to precipitate an army coup. The 1945 constitution strengthened the executive branch of government at the expense of the legislative, which is in line with Sukarno's concept of "guided democracy." [Although the necessary two-thirds majority in the Constituent Assembly is still uncertain, indications are increasing that the substantial and hitherto uncommitted vote--chiefly composed of the Moslem Nahdlatul Ulama--may support the government.] A final vote is expected on 29 or 30 May.

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[REDACTED] Army Chief of Staff General Nasution held a national military conference during the final stages of debate, presumably to influence the assembly and possibly also to determine the support of regional commanders should extreme measures be required.

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The American Embassy notes that most civilian leaders of the government are absent from Djakarta. President Sukarno, Acting President Sartono, the prime minister, all three deputy prime ministers, and more than half a dozen cabinet ministers, including some of the most important, are away on missions, either within Indonesia or abroad. General Nasution and the principal army leaders, however, are on hand.

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III. THE WEST

[REDACTED]

Haitian President's Illness Likely to Touch Off Power Struggle

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[The grave illness of Haitian President Francois Duvalier, who suffered a coronary occlusion on 24 May, will force him to withdraw at least temporarily from the political scene. The Constitution of 1957 provides that the cabinet assume executive authority if the president is temporarily unable to perform his duties. In the event of the president's death or resignation, the senior member of the Supreme Court automatically becomes provisional president and is charged with holding elections within three months.]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The cabinet has been completely dominated by the President, and is not composed of strong political figures. Theodore Nicoleau, a former minister of justice in Duvalier's first cabinet, is president of the Supreme Court. Neither he nor the cabinet is believed to enjoy sufficient popular support to prevent determined and possibly violent bids for power by opposition groups, dissident elements of the armed forces, or even ambitious officials of Duvalier's administration.]

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[The bitter political and racial tensions which have remained latent during the last several months could rise to the surface, causing a period of violence and political instability similar to that which followed the overthrow of former dictator Paul Magloire in December 1956.] [REDACTED]

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Argentine Strikers Continue Defiant Attitude

The violence growing out of strikes in several Argentine cities on 26 and 27 May seems part of a pattern of labor defiance led by various Communists and extreme Peronistas in hopes of undermining President Frondizi's government. The strike leaders have rejected any compromise in their demands and threaten further trouble if not satisfied. As demonstrated by the bank strike, now in its eighth week, these leaders do not have the full support of the union rank and file, but they have enough to interrupt business operations, to gain some unwilling compliance by threats against both workers and employers, and to promote riots and unrest.

The recent strike tactics suggest that a major aim has been to provoke politically unpopular repressive measures that would intensify labor discontent with President Frondizi and possibly gain additional support for the Peronista and Communist unions. These unions nominally control slightly more than half of organized labor. Recognizing this motive, Frondizi has relied mainly on tear gas and water hoses to quell agitation. He has also emphasized Communist responsibility which, in the 3 April riots, was clearly evident.

Nevertheless, Frondizi will probably have to resort to stronger measures. The military are supporting him and will probably continue to do so as long as he moves to quell the agitation. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
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